When it comes to competitive strategy, Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter argues that there are three generic strategies: cost leadership (which permits one to charge the lowest prices), differentiation (products/services compete based on their attributes), and focus (companies target a particular niche in a larger market). The worst possible situation is for a company to find itself “stuck in the middle” of the three generic strategies, whereby it can realize no competitive advantages and can only lose competitiveness vis-à-vis its rivals. Similarly, one could argue that nations can improve their geopolitical standard by leading political, social, and economic global change, employing their economic, political, and military resources to promote global stability, or seeking to focus on enhancing the prospects of the region in which they are located. For countries, being “stuck in the middle” of a history of conflict or instability is most unenviable. Such situations do little to provide meaningful innovations or to promote the stability in which they can increase their geopolitical position or their standard of living.

Two Middle Eastern countries that have frequently been in the recent headlines find themselves in just such a situation. Lebanon remains bent on remaining a harbor in which the Middle East’s rivalries can persist. Iran maintains its pursuit of nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community. For its part, the international community appears largely stuck in its recent history of being largely unable to promote change in Lebanon or to persuade Iran to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Major obstacles continue to block the way to peace between Lebanon and Israel. The historic Arab narrative sees Israel as an “artificial” and “illegitimate” state. Lebanon rests on a fragile, often uneasy, balance between diverse religious groups with that balance shifting toward an increasing Muslim majority dominated by the Shia. Lebanon remains a pawn in a growing geopolitical struggle between the Middle East’s forces of “Rejectionism” and “Moderation,” with Iran and Syria leading the Rejectionist elements. These factors translate into a weak central government that is unable or unwilling to make bold moves for peace, much less implement them.

The biggest danger for a breakdown in negotiations, if they even get started, would come from an attempt by Lebanon to link a peace agreement to overall Middle East peace. In that case, the Lebanese Government might as well link a peace agreement with world peace and harmony. In neither case, would bilateral peace be practical. With Syrian and Palestinian demands likely irreconcilable for the foreseeable future, such linkage could only preclude the possibility for a bilateral peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which is otherwise readily realizable. Syria would seek to bring the Golan Heights into the calculus while radical Palestinian groups would seek a “right of return” of all Palestinian refugees and their descendants to Israel. The first demand would greatly complicate the diplomacy involved and the latter would be a “deal breaker.”

It is that position of being “stuck in the middle” that has made diplomatic breakthroughs so rare in the Middle East. Nonetheless, Lebanon remains firmly mired in that middle. On August 20, 2006, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Fouad Siniora suggested that Israel, if it ‘behaves wisely,’ could be in a position to enter into a peace treaty with Lebanon. Just 10 days later, he reversed himself, declaring, “Let it be clear, we are not seeking any agreement until there is a just and comprehensive peace based on the Arab initiative.” He also added that he would not engage in any direct negotiations with Israel’s leaders. The 2002 Saudi Arabian initiative to which he refers left some of the region’s most intractable issues, such as that concerning the Palestinian refugees who would need to settle in a new Palestinian state rather than Israel, unresolved. That initiative was presented as a “take it or leave it” proposition. It was not subject to any kind of negotiations. Not surprisingly, it did not prove to be a recipe for peace.

If the international community wishes to help Lebanon break free of the webs of the region’s historic disputes that have fueled recurrent outbreaks of hostilities and caused significant harm to Lebanon’s people and development, it would tie reconstruction assistance to Lebanon’s embarking on a path of bilateral peace. Just as the international community’s quest for a “sustainable ceasefire” rapidly crumbled from a lack of resolve on the part of its leaders, the same absence of resolve is likely to financially underwrite the decision of Lebanon's leadership to remain “stuck” in a history that has stunted Lebanon’s post-World War II development.

In the second case, Iran remains "stuck" in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. With great fanfare, the “5+1” Group (China, Russia, Britain, France, United States + Germany) introduced a comprehensive package of incentives to encourage Iran to forego its ongoing nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities and the United Nations gave Iran until August 31 to cease such activities. However, that document missed the single sanction likely to be effective: that of curbing Iran's ability to sell oil on the world market. Today, the deadline has arrived and Iran has not “established full and sustained suspension” of “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development…”

Instead, Iran continues to push ahead with its nuclear activities. On August 26, Iran inaugurated a new heavy water plant at Arak. In launching the plant, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continued to define Iran’s nuclear pursuit as a matter of national right and “intellectual and scientific progress.” He then unveiled a new line of argument—one that has often been employed by aggressors in the past—that will be the centerpiece of a fresh campaign to head off the small possibility of a meaningful international sanctions regime. He argued that Iran poses no threat to any country and has not posed such a threat for centuries. “Different nations and ethnic groups [living in lands bordering] Iran have lived in peace and quiet for centuries without encountering any aggression on the part of Iran,” he declared. Moreover, even as President Ahmadinejad has repeatedly pledged to “wipe Israel off the map,” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi stated, “we do not pose a threat to any state, not even to the Zionist regime…” Will the gullible bite at this new bait?

In the lead-up to World War II, Germany and Italy made similar assertions, sometimes even as they undertook acts of aggression. They energetically sought non-aggression pacts, repeatedly expressed their desire for negotiated solutions to their demands, and insisted on receiving security guarantees. On May 17, 1937, The Washington Post reported that Germany was seeking to enter into a 25-year mutual defense treaty with Great Britain, France, and Belgium. In December 1938, Germany sought a non-aggression agreement with France. In August 1939, following bilateral discussions between Germany and Italy, it was reported that both countries were in “100 percent agreement” that the dispute over Danzig was “not worth war” and would be resolved peacefully. Instead, Germany and Italy employed ceaseless diplomatic activity to deceive the world and buy time to prepare for fresh acts of aggression that inevitably followed.

Now that Iran has not heeded the international community’s call for it to cease its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities, it is up to the international community to demonstrate that such defiance is unacceptable. Iran expects little meaningful response. Iran may well prove correct in its calculations. It is more than likely that the international community will be unable to summon the will to impose rigorous sanctions that target Iran’s ability to sell oil on the world market. As a result, Iran will pocket its nuclear gains to date, absorb whatever criticism is directed at it—even some minimal sanctions, should they be adopted, which is far from certain—and essentially stay its present course.

All said, with Lebanon, Iran, and the international community remaining “stuck in the middle” of their recent history, the dance between these three parties can almost be likened to a hamster wheel. Around and around they spin it from violent hostilities to ceasefire to return of the status quo ante to a renewal of hostilities. So long as none of these parties can liberate themselves from the clutches of their recent history, the seeds for future conflict will continue to be fertilized and those seeds will likely germinate anew at some time in the future. For now, the prospects for peace between Lebanon and Israel are in danger of vanishing before they could even be pursued in a serious fashion. At the same time, Iran’s age of nuclear weapons continues to draw ever closer.

By: Don Sutherland
Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.

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